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ABSTRACT 
Bryan Mark Dougan: Where there are (No) Drugs: The Movement for Global Mental Health and 
the Use of Psychopharmaceuticals in East Africa 
(Under the direction of Peter Redfield) 
 
This research traces new discourses and practices related to pharmaceuticalization in global 
health research interventions for depression. In the era of “biomedical psychiatry” and “global 
health,” life-saving pharmaceuticals have become an increasingly dominant mode of treating 
patients. Around the world, especially in the Global South, groups have fought with governments 
and corporations to secure access to these drugs despite global patent laws and the desire to 
generate significant profits. For a small group of research who are part of the Movement for 
Global Mental Health, however, their discourses and interventions reject the use of medications 
from global pharmaceutical companies in treating depression while infrequently using 
medications produced in local markets. This paper seeks to think through anthropological 
concerns of pharmaceuticalization when medications are not present or a priority by examining 
underlying logics of how these researchers do and do not use pharmaceuticals. 
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CHAPTER 1: “Global Mental Health is not Big Pharma.” 
  
In this paper I discuss the place of pharmaceuticals within the Movement for Global 
Mental Health (GMH), with a case study on how they implement depression treatments in East 
Africa. In most circumstances globally, especially in East Africa, GMH researchers implement 
research-interventions to examine the reduction of depressive symptoms using talk therapies, or 
psychosocial interventions, instead of pharmaceuticals. In a recent April 2016 keynote address at 
Georgetown University, Vikram Patel, an Indian psychiatrist who is one of the chief architects of 
GMH, emphatically reiterated that they avoid pharmaceuticals as much as possible in order to 
separate themselves from the influence of pharmaceutical companies in other medical spheres: 
“Global Mental Health is not Big Pharma.” Later at the conference where Patel spoke, someone 
asked a question about pharmaceuticals during a Q&A session after a panel. The panelist 
responded briefly, noting that if pharmaceuticals are used, they should be used contextually. If 
we consider the context of the first three studies that would facilitate GMH’s emergence, 
researchers associated with GMH have not conducted pharmacological interventions to treat 
depression in Uganda (Bolton et al, 2003). In contrast, GMH interventions in India (Patel et al, 
2003, 2010) and Chile (Araya et al, 2003) have had pharmaceutical components for depression 
trials. 
 Prior to helping launch the Movement for Global Mental Health, in 2003 Patel published 
a book entitled Where There is No Psychiatrist: A Mental Health Care Guide. This book serves 
as a guide for non-physician, mental health practitioners in the absence of a trained psychiatrist, 
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particularly in the Global South. It lays out strategies on how to diagnose and treat patients, 
which includes pharmaceuticals. Thirteen years after the publication that text and one of his first 
studies in India, Patel’s publications and speech suggest a change of mind. Such change of mind 
is reflected in the title of this essay. Patel’s book title definitively proscribes methods to approach 
mental health in the absence of trained doctors. The parenthesis in the title of this essay, 
however, reflect uncertain place of pharmaceuticals in GMH. Here, I argue that pharmaceuticals 
have a subordinated place in the Movement for Global Mental health rhetoric and research 
publications. It is not a question of whether they are present; they are. Instead, this essay seeks to 
understand where exactly pharmaceuticals are and the logics behind their use.  
In discussing the place of pharmaceuticals within the Movement for Global Mental 
Health (GMH), I use a case study on depression treatments in East Africa because of GMH’s 
heavy emphasis on treating mood disorders in contrast to other mental health disorders. If GMH 
is not a front for pharmaceutical companies, according to Patel’s claim, yet there are 
pharmaceutical studies that claim linkages to GMH, where are pharmaceuticals in the broader 
political economy of GMH, psychiatric practices, and corporate influences? How can we think 
about this non-use – or dare I say, later rejection – of pharmaceuticals in an era where some 
anthropologists claim the world is becoming more pharmaceuticalized (Biehl, 2007; Jenkins, 
2010)?  Vikram Patel (2003) has considered the kind of practices needed “where there is no 
psychiatrist.” This paper is part of what can become a broader discussion of what happens in 
global psychiatric practices “where there are (no) pharmaceuticals.” 
 The example of GMH’s (non) use of pharmaceuticals, especially in East Africa, requires 
further investigation because it does not follow the expected trajectory of anthropological 
research concerning global health and psychiatry. Following anthropologist João Biehl (2007), 
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we would expect GMH would have a more “pharmaceutical-centered public health” vision for 
health and treatment. Yet Patel and others reject and sparingly use pharmaceuticals in their 
interventions. Psychiatry as well, according to anthropologist T.M. Luhrmann (2000), has 
undergone a shift from more psychotherapy treatments to pharmacological regimens. GMH, 
however, implements more talk therapy programs than pharmaceutical programs. While in many 
places of the world pharmaceuticals are the dominant therapeutic regimes, GMH’s rhetoric and 
practices run against the grain of both Biehl and Luhrmann’s theorizations. 
 I situate this work within the broader conversations around “Critical Global Health” 
(Biehl & Petryna, 2013; Adams, 2016). Here, I am not interested in taking a stance on the 
practices of GMH researchers; there is enough internal GMH debate on their own practices and 
assumptions (Patel, 2014; Summerfield 2008, 2012). Instead, this paper examines the practices 
and underlying assumptions and contradictions of a particular group of scientists and their work, 
which ultimately seeks to alleviate very real suffering and anguish in the world. In drawing on 
my experience at the April 2016 conference and the GMH scientific literature, I think of this 
work as an “ethnography of a subfield.”1 Following anthropologist Alex Nading’s (2015) work 
on dengue scientists, I explore the actions and discourses of a particular group of scientists as 
their try to achieve their goals. GMH scientists, in contrast to the dengue scientists that Nading 
followed, actively do not appeal to pharmaceutical companies for funding and therapies. 
 As such, I aim to make two related arguments: First, I suggest that scientists who claim 
their work as “global health” do not all have the same political-economic relationship to 
pharmaceutical corporations and deploy market logics differently based on the politics and 
histories of the particular disease on which their work focuses. Second, that the work of GMH 
                                                
1 Thanks to Luise White for this turn of phrase as a point of clarification in her discussant 
comments at the Triangle African Studies Workshop. 
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scientists asks anthropologists to reconsider the role of pharmaceuticals in global health 
interventions. While it is certainly true that many environments are increasingly 
pharmaceuticalized, I hope to demonstrate that GMH spaces are actively and intentionally not 
therapeutically pharmaceutical spaces. 
 I begin this discussion with the place of pharmaceuticals in the GMH literature. Then, I 
discuss GMH’s relationships to global health and psychiatry. With this in mind, I review recent 
anthropological literature around pharmaceuticals in relationship to GMH. As a case study, I 
discuss the Bolton study mentioned previously to consider the role of pharmaceuticals in GMH 
in East Africa. I will use three initial studies published in 2003 that are, arguably, the first three 
Global Mental Health research-interventions (Patel et al, 2003): the Araya et al (2003) study in 
Chile, the Bolton et al (2003) study in Uganda, and the Patel et al (2003) study in India. In the 
context of the Bolton study, is there something about the East African context where Bolton and 
his colleagues begin their work that creates space for non-pharmaceuticalized practices?  
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CHAPTER 2: Pharmaceuticals as Non-Priority 
  
I begin with an examination of how pharmaceuticals broadly, not just medications for 
depression, are discussed in agenda-setting documents that GMH researchers have themselves 
published in peer-reviewed journals and textbooks and WHO policy documents on which they 
draw (For more extensive review on GMH, see Bemme & D’Souza, 2014). At stake is the ways 
in which GMH supports (or does not) the use of pharmacological interventions in low-resource 
settings. In doing this, I examine the discursive practices in which GMH actors engage around 
pharmaceuticals as researchers set their goals. I argue that from the outset of GMH, unlike 
elsewhere in global health, it appears that pharmaceuticals are not a priority in developing 
interventions or building health system infrastructure in low-resource settings. I will suggest 
several factors for this, including adherence to a logic of “cost-effectiveness” and the relationship 
between ethics and infrastructure.  
 In 2007, the Lancet published six articles as part of a series on “Global Mental Health” 
(GMH). Authored by researchers trained in anthropology, epidemiology and medicine 
(especially psychiatry), among others, these articles followed conventional global health topics: 
current knowledge on the global burden of psychiatric disorder and the relationship of 
psychiatric illness to other global health challenges such as HIV/AIDS, access to treatment and 
prevention, several on health services and infrastructure, and the final call to action. GMH has 
two main goals: decrease prevalence of mental disorder (Kessler et al, 2005) and close the 
treatment gap, defined as the difference between the number of people with a mental disorder 
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and their ability to get services, the implications on the work of GMH actors I will address 
throughout the text (Patel et al, 2010). While GMH discusses mental illnesses broadly, 
researchers tend to focus on mood disorders, like depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), instead of psychotic disorders like schizophrenia (Patel & Kleinman, 2003; Lund et al, 
2012). 
 In the 2007 Lancet publications, scholars briefly discuss pharmaceuticals for depression. 
In their review of treatment and prevention, Patel et al (2007) provide the context of five 
randomized control trials that reduced depression in low- and middle-income countries. Of these 
five, only the Ayara and Patel studies, involved pharmaceuticals. In the sixth essay, 
pharmaceuticals are part of the action plan. In listing among the primary targets making “basic 
pharmacological treatments available in primary care” (Lancet Global Mental Health Group, 
2007: 1244), the authors call for increased treatment access, a central tenet of global health-
related projects (Biehl & Petryna, 2013). The authors define the measure as increased 
pharmaceuticals for a number of psychiatric disorders, not just depression.  
 While researchers used pharmaceuticals in important studies leading up to the first GMH 
publications, they are rarely found even in more recent studies. For example, in 2014 GMH 
researchers started their own journal, Global Mental Health. An open access journal published 
yearly, its formation further solidifies GMH as a sub-discipline within global health. By creating 
specific means through which to offer researchers an outlet to publish, GMH scholars indicate 
they have established enough evidence to warrant their own journal. In a review of titles and 
searching the first three editions of journal, not a single publication focuses on the provision or 
use of pharmaceuticals in a research environment. Publications instead focus on epidemiological 
studies and outcomes of research interventions around the world on a broad range of mental 
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disorders and comorbidities, as well as offering a space for editorial debates. Focusing on non-
pharmaceutical interventions and studies suggests that the emphasis for treatment is lies beyond 
the pharmaceutical-based models for public health work. 
 In 2011, important publications emerged in two journals. First, in July 2011, led by 
Pamela Collins at the US’ National Institutes of Mental Health, researchers published the “Grand 
Challenges for Global Mental Health,” listing out twenty-five priorities for the GMH movement 
to guide research in Nature. In this list, Collins and her colleagues (2011:29) state that one of 
their top five priorities is to “Reduce the cost and improve the supply of effective medications.” 
The other four broadly look towards the goal of health system capacity building, or in global 
health parlance, “scaling up.” And yet, Collins and her coauthors also offer a move towards 
removing pharmaceuticals. In a list of research questions, Collins et al (2011: 29) write, “How 
will increased understanding of neural circuits lead to alternatives to current pharmacological 
interventions?” I interpret this question as looking forward to the future when researchers can 
design interventions informed by how the brain works without needing medications. Following 
this logic, then, neuroscience becomes the site of developing alternative interventions to 
pharmaceuticals. This, of course, is interesting given the lack of focus on, if not rejection of, 
using neuroscientific models in GMH, which I discuss in detail later. It is unclear what exactly 
these alternatives would be and how they would operate in low-resource settings. Nevertheless, 
this focus on the brain without medication suggestions a horizon of imagination that envisions 
the separation of science, here neuroscience neurobiology, from its political economic influence, 
i.e. big pharma, and can help people undefiled by corporate priorities.  
 The second important set publications are published in October-November in the Lancet 
as the second series on Global Mental Health, a follow-up and expansion on the initial 2007 
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series. In these papers, psychopharmaceuticals are mentioned as a concern but not identified as a 
priority. In the first paper, Lund et al (2011) state that psychotropic drugs can play a role in 
reducing poverty through the reduction of mental illness, yet it is not listed as a priority. The 
same is true of the assessment of humanitarian settings by Tol et al (2011): drugs have been 
used, but they are not a solution. In their discussion of scaling up mental health services, Eaton et 
al (2011) note that low- and middle-income countries need drugs but have neither the 
infrastructure nor the data to make psychopharmaceuticals a focus of care. In this way, like the 
first Lancet series, psychotropic drugs, regardless of diagnosis, are not included in 
recommendations. 
Agenda-setting journal publications are not the sources of GMH policy and ideas. Of 
importance to GMH are also World Health Organization (WHO) initiatives. In 2001, the WHO 
published its annual World Health Report focused on mental health entitled Mental Health: New 
Understanding, New Hope. In this document, the WHO outlines the state of mental health care 
around the world and various treatment options, including pharmaceuticals. The authors write, 
“The appropriate treatment of mental disorders implies the rational use of pharmacological, 
psychological and psychosocial interventions in a clinically meaningful, balanced, and well-
integrated way” (WHO, 2001: 55). They reiterate a similar point a few pages later: “The 
management of mental and behavioral disorders – perhaps more particularly than that of other 
medical conditions – calls for the balanced combination of three fundamental ingredients: 
medication (or pharmacotherapy); psychotherapy; and psychosocial rehabilitation” (WHO, 2001: 
59). In pairing these three therapeutic activities together, the WHO sets up a three-part model for 
treatment with which neither GMH researchers or psychiatrists would disagree. The challenge, of 
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course, is the actualization of this vision for treatment, a challenge the WHO document openly 
acknowledges.  
 The WHO authors also acknowledge a point that later seems foundational for GMH 
interventions and actions: “Encouraging evidence has recently emerged in relation to the cost-
effectiveness of psychotherapeutic approaches to the management of psychosis and a range of 
mood and stress-related disorders, in combination with or as an alternative to pharmacotherapy” 
(WHO, 2001: 62). One point that is key here is that while this WHO document has a more global 
vision, its publication happened before GMH scholars began to emerge in a particular formation, 
at least visibly. The Araya, Bolton, and Patel studies were either underway by this time or 
finished, although their studies were not published nor they would not put their interventions in 
conversation with each other until later (Patel et al, 2003b). What this indicates is the WHO put 
forward a vision related to increased access to and presence of pharmaceuticals, which is tied 
into its push for essential medicines (Greene, 2011). The GMH scholars do follow its lead, and it 
is an approach with which they are sympathetic.  
 A year after the World Health Report, the WHO endorsed Mental Health Global Action 
Program, or mhGAP, which the organization would publish in 2008 (WHO, 2008). The goal of 
mhGAP is “the WHO action programme developed for countries especially with low and lower 
middle incomes for scaling up services for mental, neurological, and substance use disorders” 
(WHO, 2008: 1). The program and its intervention guide, published in 2010 (WHO, 2010), do 
emphasize pharmacological interventions but alongside of psychosocial interventions like talk 
therapies. In fact, the mhGAP Intervention Guide provides suggestions on pharmacological 
research interventions, while directing readers to a 2009 WHO publication called 
Pharmacological Treatment of Mental Disorders in Primary Health Care that lays out in great 
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detail the kinds of pharmaceutical interventions appropriate for individual disorders. The 
mhGAP program, according to anthropologist Byron Good (2010: 122), “suggests too few drugs 
rather than too many, particularly for psychotic illnesses; too little understanding of the potential 
benefits of medications rather than too great expectations; too little access to the full range of 
antipsychotics,” among other things. The WHO program, then, places significant emphasis on 
the need to increase access to and knowledge about pharmaceuticals. 
 So what do we make of their discourses? Even as Vikram Patel acknowledges the 
mhGAP program in his keynote address, there are clearly different goals between the WHO and 
GMH documents: the WHO documents want more pharmaceuticals whereas GMH does not. In 
the Grand Challenges and the original call to action, GMH researchers put forward as a therapy 
worth investing in. This aspiration, however, is contextual: “Even new and highly effective 
pharmacological treatments would need well functioning health systems to deliver them, and 
psychosocial interventions to accompany them, if they were to be effective” (Lancet Global 
Mental Health Group, 2007: 1246-7). In this sense, the GMH documents overlap with the WHO 
guides, indicating pharmaceuticals require functioning health care systems, but, the tone this 
quote offers some hesitation. Yet each group draws slightly different lessons from needing a 
functioning health system. GMH operates in a “projectified landscape” (Whyte et al, 2012) 
where GMH researchers develop small-scale projects without the promise of long-term systemic 
care, whereas WHO is typically more focused on government-level programming. With regards 
to Big Pharma, there is no indication that the WHO rejects Big Pharma in the way that Vikram 
Patel and his colleagues do, even though some of Patel’s coauthors that work for the WHO. For 
both groups, however, their solution for pharmaceuticals is the provision of government funding 
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for public health infrastructure that can support acquiring and dispensing of medications as well 
as support other interventions. Before investing in pharmaceuticals, infrastructure must exist.  
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CHAPTER 3: Pharmaceuticals and Cost-Effectiveness in GMH 
  
If the GMH policy documents are, at best, ambivalent towards pharmaceuticals, we need 
to consider some of the reasons why that might be. First, we need to look towards the ideas that 
bring together a diverse set of actors and ideologies under “global health.” This is, in part, 
because Vikram Patel, in his keynote address in April 2016, sees GMH as “global health, not 
psychiatry.” Because of the diversity of actors in global health, it is loosely held together by 
several principles, one of which is cost-effectiveness (Adams, 2013; 2016). To test and measure 
cost-effectiveness, global health actors deploy metrics in order to examine if they achieve their 
goal. In this section, I examine the relationship between ideas of cost-effectiveness, metrics, and 
the (non) use of pharmaceuticals in Global Mental Health. In examining this relationship, I argue 
that cost-effectiveness determines the priorities of GMH treats. In using a rubric of cost-
effectiveness to determine priorities, GMH actors also determine to not use pharmaceuticals 
unless contextualized, as the panelist from the 2016 conference remarked. 
 Cost-effectiveness is defined as “economic calculi [that] are affixed to interventions in 
what that make cost something that must be accounted for in the same ways that things like 
‘rates of diarrhea’ are counted (and studied statistically). This makes sense because one wants to 
show that spending money on health care (however much or however little) ‘pays off’ in health 
dividends in the end” (Adams, 2013: 70). Researchers must develop measurements to make sure 
that the way in which they implement an intervention is done well but cheaply; if either are not 
met, then the study runs the risk of not being published or being published in a less prestigious 
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journal. In GMH research this means seeing whether or not the reduction of depression or PTSD 
is commensurate with not only the amount of money spent on the intervention, but also the 
amount of money it would cost to scale up a program a point to which I return momentarily.  
 With a goal of scaling up, researchers must also insure that the results of their study will 
have a wider impact. There are numerous metrics significant to this work, one of which, on a 
very broad and global scale, is the DALY, or Disability Adjusted Life Year (Murray, 1994; 
World Bank, 1993; for GMH related critiques of DALY, see Becker et al, 2013; Kleinman & 
Kleinman, 1994). Developed by economist-physician Christopher Murray and epidemiologist 
Alan Lopez, “[i]n essence, the DALY provides an economic measure of human productive 
values by calculating the loss of productivity to disease or disability” (Adams, 2016: 27). 
Through measuring how much productivity was lost, researchers and policy makers can use the 
DALY to set policy priorities through allocating funding and resources to combat diseases that 
took away from economic productivity and growth. The DALY ranks illnesses and countries and 
facilitates comparison across those categories to determine priorities. The metric does not 
determine an intervention is, but help researchers and policy makers determine priorities on what 
illness to focus and for which to develop programs. In considering mental disorders, according to 
the most recent DALY estimates published in October 2016, depressive disorders rank 15th on 
the top 30 list of disorders with the highest DALY rates, moving up from 19th in 1990 and 17th in 
2005 and anxiety disorders are 28th (GBD 2015 DALYs and HALE Collaborators, 2016: 1633). 
What this means is that, of the mental disorders, depression has the highest economic burden 
worldwide since the initial study. To focus on depression means that GMH scholars can have the 
largest impact on disease worldwide. 
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 This, in part, helps to reveal why depression and depressive disorders are the primary 
focus of GMH interventions. But what does this have to do with pharmaceuticals? At least two 
things. First, because depression is highest ranked, other illnesses that require pharmaceuticals, 
such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, are not priorities because to treat them means fewer 
people will receive treatment. [I will insert prevalence rates here to demonstrate this in final]. To 
be clear, this is not about the cost of the medications for these disorders, but about how it affects 
the world population and its economy. 
 Second, there are several treatment options for depression beyond pharmaceuticals. As 
such, researchers must decide how to develop interventions for depressive disorders. Will they 
use medications? Psychosocial interventions? A combination of both? Do they start with human 
and physical infrastructure first? This decision is also one of cost-effectiveness, especially when 
researchers use the Randomized Control Trial, or RCT, “the statistically robust, randomized and 
controlled, cost-effectively constituted, experimentally designed, outcome-measureable 
intervention/research project (or some proximate version thereof)” (Adams, 2106: 31). Creating 
at least two groups – an intervention and control group – within a target population, researchers 
recruit and offer a randomly selected group of eligible participants the possibility to participate. 
Through using statistical methods and programs, researchers randomly assign each participant to 
the intervention or the control group. At the end of the trial, researchers compare the groups 
against each other to see whether the intervention had an impact on particular outcomes. 
 RCTs can show which treatments are the most cost-effective by comparing them within 
the same study, always with a control. Considering the three studies from 2003, all of which used 
the RCT method. In the Bolton and Araya studies, the group therapy interventions were 
successful in relationship to the control; in the Patel study, the individual therapy was not, which 
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the authors note was because it was not culturally appropriate (Patel et al, 2003b: 539). In the 
Araya and Patel studies, using pharmaceuticals proved successful (Patel et al, 2003b: 540). 
Additionally, “[t]he Indian study showed that treating depression produces a significant 
reduction in total healthcare costs” (Patel et al, 2003b: 540), something that could not have been 
seen without the RCT method. 
 As Patel, Araya, and Bolton (2003: 540) note, “we found evidence for efficacy of 
depression interventions that we believe are locally feasible and cost-effective among the poorest 
people in that setting.” In other words, the researchers had scalability in mind. In considering 
feasibility and affordability, Araya, Bolton, and Patel had questions in mind of whether this was 
something reproducible at a larger level. If the poorest people in a particular setting could afford 
the treatment on their own, then these interventions could potentially be implemented in other 
parts of the country and even integrated into national healthcare systems.  
 Yet feasibility is also cognizant of context. As Bolton and his coauthors (2003: 3117) 
write, “Both antidepressants and psychotherapy have been shown to be efficacious in numerous 
controlled trials in developed countries…However, use of antidepressants is not feasible in this 
region because of high cost and limited supply infrastructure.”  The lack of pharmaceuticals is 
because of money and infrastructure. From this, it seems evident that the researchers on the 
Bolton study wanted to use pharmaceuticals, but ultimately could not justify it because of 
affordability.  
 Here the logic of cost-effectiveness overrode the logic of a pharmaceutical-centered 
public health in Uganda. It was cheaper to translate materials into Luganda, the Ugandan 
language with the largest number of speakers, to hire and train community health workers, and to 
implement a talk therapy intervention than it was to treat people with pharmaceuticals. I 
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hypothesize this choice had to do with a combination of physical infrastructure, especially since 
there was no clinical component, and the absence of a strong pharmaceutical market. Had the 
Bolton study happened after 2004 with the Ugandan rollout of anti-retroviral medication, one 
cannot help but wonder whether psychopharmaceuticals would have dovetailed nicely to these 
interventions and contribute to a “projectified landscape”  Their study, conducted in a rural area, 
occurred because the introduction of anti-retroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS treatment into Uganda 
in 2004, which would have likely helped to facilitate the introduction of psychopharmaceuticals, 
especially in an already existing “projectified landscape” (Whyte et al, 2013), where Bolton and 
his colleagues were not the only Hopkins research team in the area, as I discuss below.  
 GMH, particularly in east Africa, is also part of this “projectified landscape.” As 
counseling in east Africa in particular becomes legible through HIV projects (Vaughan, 2016), 
these research trials become one of many projects from which individuals can receive health care 
broadly. What is different is that there are fewer mental health projects to choose from because 
the government clinics likely have minimal healthcare provision for mental health services (Raja 
et al, 2014). In implementing these trials, GMH researchers aim to conduct experimental trials to 
scale up and, ultimately, close the treatment gap. In doing this, however, we need to consider: 
what facilitates these interventions on the ground? What conceptions of illness are being treated? 
What kinds of ethical and temporal claims do actors use to treat these particular diseases?  
 
 17 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: Depressive Symptomology & Experimental Ethics in GMH 
  
Now, I want to turn to examining what helps to facilitate the implementation of GMH 
research interventions. Because the ethos of cost-effectiveness drives an obsession with metrics, 
it is important to think about the conditions of developing and measuring of these metrics. In this 
section, I examine the symptomology of depression, the technologies used to measure it, and the 
ethics that emerge in GMH interventions, specifically in non-pharmaceutical interventions, using 
the Bolton project in Uganda as a case study. I argue that the broader focus on symptoms than 
disorder facilitates an experimental ethics that sit in opposition to biomedical psychiatric 
practices. 
 To answer these questions, I want to briefly situate depression within the context of 
transcultural psychiatry. As historian Matthew Heaton (2014) demonstrates, depression has a 
long history within transcultural psychiatry, a sub-discipline with which many GMH scholars 
would associate or, at minimum, draw on theoretically and methodologically. In examining the 
role that Nigerian psychiatrists played in the globalization of psychiatry during the 1950s 
through the 1980s, a period marked by Nigerian decolonization and the beginning of neoliberal 
reform, Heaton shows that depression and its translatability is one of the main scholarly and 
medical concerns within transcultural psychiatry. At that time, there was a general acceptance of 
the universality of mental illness even if transcultural psychiatrists from the US, Canada, “they 
were not nearly so confident about their ability to treat those diseases with preexisting Western-
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derived therapies” (Heaton, 2014: 131). Some forty years later, GMH scholars become the group 
that more intentionally picks this concern up and scientifically show this translation is possible.  
To think about why GMH scholars are now more confident, I want to consider the 
movement's understanding of symptoms for two interconnected reasons. First, what GMH actors 
(and other medical actors like doctors, humanitarian organizations, and ministries of health) 
define as the problem shapes the ways in which they devise plans for treatment and intervention. 
Symptoms are often grouped together to create a particular pathology. This pathology, then, 
demands particular forms of treatment and care, which assume particular kinds of expertise, 
technology, and temporality. As actors define the symptoms and the ailments, they inevitably 
assume a particular kind of subject whose ailment is recognizable given the particular context in 
which healing occurs.  
 Second, symptoms are the means through which patients articulate their ailments. As 
Biehl and Moran-Thomas (2009: 273) write, "symptoms are more than contingent matters; they 
are, at times, a necessary condition for us to articulate a relationship to the world and to others." 
In other worlds, symptoms become one means through which an individual reveals the subjective 
experiences of the self in a medical encounter. This reflects a particular subjective experience, as 
Biehl and Moran-Thomas discuss, which allow those with afflictions to speak about social and 
bodily conditions, situated within a particular context. This subjective position, then, is "perhaps 
less a matter of finding a voice than establishing oneself as part of a matrix in which there is 
someone to hear it" (Biehl & Moran-Thomas, 2009: 282).  
 In addition to its high DALY scores, thinking with depression in the context of GMH 
becomes a case study of sorts to illuminate the relationship between GMH, psychiatry, and 
pharmaceuticals because depression has a slightly longer, more continuous history than other 
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disorders. Diagnostic categories like PTSD emerge in standardized forms in 1980 when the 
American Psychiatric Association published the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Leys, 2000; Young, 1995). For categories like depression, 
however, they underwent a different transformation: the classification for depression became a 
more biomedicalized definition. 
 Before I move on, I want to briefly describe the diagnosis of unipolar depression. Under 
the DSM-IV-R, depression is classified a mood disorder (APA, 2000).2 At minimum, one of two 
symptoms are required: a depressed mood for most of the day, every day, for two weeks, or a 
loss of interest or pleasure in most of a day’s activities, nearly everyday. An affected person must 
experience at least four more of the following symptoms nearly every day: significant weight 
loss or gain over two weeks, or increased or decreased appetite; insomnia or hypersomnia; 
psychomotor agitation or retardation; fatigue or loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or 
excessive or inappropriate guilt; diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness; and 
recurring thoughts of death, or suicidal thoughts with or without a plan. Depression is linked to a 
neurochemical imbalance in the brain; as such recommended treatment is psychopharmaceuticals 
to restore the neurochemistry. A depressed patient can use psychotherapy in connection with 
medication, although because of the biological links, the latter is more frequently used.  
 The standardizing feature of suffering among mood disorders, and thus the standard 
marker for depression, is its persisting deviation from the norm. Being depressed is not 
inherently a pathological experience; what is abnormal is the degree and duration of the 
                                                
2 Using DSM categories is not only way to diagnose depression. Other standardized texts involve 
the ICD-10 (Bowker & Star, 1999), created by the WHO used widely in Europe and the Global 
South, and the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), favored by the US' National Institutes of 
Mental Health. I use the DSM narrative because of its well-documented history within the 
anthropological literature as well as that it highlights quite clearly some of the shifts I aim to 
reveal.  
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depressed mood. Such change in mood must also influence other social functioning; this can 
include work and social relationships. Depression influences all forms of functionality. In this 
way, depression then is a withdrawal from the social. Depression does not require a particular 
event; rather, it is own a slow descent away from the constructed expectations of depressed 
emotions. 
 To examine the shifting practices around DSM-defined depression, particularly with 
regards to non-American populations, I examine the practices around symptom checklists often 
used to provide or supplement diagnoses. Broadly, symptom checklists are printed on paper and 
come in different lengths and formats. Physicians and other medical professionals use them as a 
means of receiving a possible diagnosis in a shorter amount of time. An illustrative checklist 
example, commonly used in GMH, is the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL). Developed in 
1974 with its origins in the Cornell Medical Index developed in the 1950s, the HSCL is a three-
page document, a grid with 26 rows and five columns. The columns list the symptoms 
individually. Each column represents the rating scale: not at all, a little, quite a bit, or extremely, 
which are scored on a scale of 1-4, respectively. For each symptom, a patient will rate how he or 
she feels for each symptom. For example, a patient could be asked, "How sad have you been in 
the last two weeks, on a scale of 1 to 4, 1 being not sad and 4 being very sad?" The patient then 
responds, "three." At the end, three scores are calculated: 1) the Anxiety Score, an average of the 
first section; 2) the Depression Score, an average of the second section; and 3) the Total Score, 
the average of all 25 questions. Having a score over 1.75 for any of the three calculations 
indicates the respondent is symptomatic.  
 When initially developed, the HSCL was standardized to psychiatric practices at the time. 
Following 1980, however, adapting to the DSM-III meant that it was necessary to adapt and re-
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standardize psychiatric practices and documents to the now-biomedicalized definitions. This was 
not only true in psychiatry, but also in cross-cultural psychiatry. In a landmark 1987 paper, 
Harvard psychiatrist Richard Mollica and his colleagues validated a translated version of the 
HSCL-25 to the DSM-III. To validate it meant researchers subjected the checklist to a series of 
statistical analyses to test whether or not the properties of the checklist remained the same, given 
that the DSM-III defined disorders. In this validation, Mollica and his coauthors show that the 
checklist does not change despite the already-changed standards and the linguistic and cultural 
translation of the checklist,  
 Given their institutional affiliation, perhaps it is little surprise that Bolton and his 
colleagues used the HSCL. In Uganda, Bolton and his study team undergo a similar statistical 
process, validating the HSCL in Luganda, a widely spoken Ugandan language, to the DSM-IV, 
released in 1996. But, influenced by cultural psychiatry, Bolton and his colleagues go beyond the 
biomedical checklist to ask about indigenous conceptions of illness. They uncover two 
"depressionlike syndromes" that they used in the screening process: the interviewers "asked the 
responder if they thought that they had Yo'kewkyawa and/or Okwekubazida. If the person denied 
having either syndrome, they were not interviewed further" (Bolton et al, 2003: 3119). Despite 
using this as a screening mechanism based on previous research that indicated significant overlap 
between the two experiences, Bolton and colleagues do not describe the ways in which these two 
are "depressionlike." There is no sense of what may be different in terms of somatic expressions, 
bodily experiences, where in the body the illness is located, and importantly, what healing 
practices alleviated these syndromes. Yet "[b]ecause each local syndrome is only an 
approximation of depressive illness, self-report and outside reports of their presence were used in 
screening only and not as outcome measures" (Bolton et al, 2003: 3119; emphasis mine).  
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 In this act of screening but not measuring, we can glean some insight into how GMH 
researchers think about symptoms. Here, GMH researchers recognize that individuals may have 
different understandings of mental illness and its symptomology. In an editorial published 
alongside of the 2007 Lancet series, the authors reminded readers "don't forget about culture!" 
(Bass et al, 2007). In the context of the Bolton study, these differences, at least in print, only 
matter in particular places, in particular, for entry into the study. In this way there is recognition 
of some kind of cultural specificity and overlap, but ultimately they are not ontologically the 
same experience. The existence of Yo'kewkyawa and Okwekubazida are recognized and do have 
some value within the study, but subordinated to the DSM. In this way, the hegemony of 
biomedical categories as a result of, at minimum, the requirements of publication.3 
 In this way, symptoms must be “testable,” in that researchers must use a mechanism, here 
the checklist, to track the hopeful decrease in symptoms. The outcomes of the study surprised 
Bolton and his collaborators (2003: 3124): “Under these circumstances [of uncertainty in 
facilitator training], the effects of this intervention impressed us.” The intervention worked. But 
to be impressed indicates some skepticism and hesitation that it may not work. This is, of course, 
because in conducting this trial, it was arguably the first of its kind on the African continent 
conducted by and recognized under the rubric of “global health.” Given that they did not know 
whether the intervention would work, there is a kind of experimentality to the project (Nyugen, 
2009, 2013). In conducting this test of decreasing symptomology, Bolton and his colleagues take 
on an “ethics of experiment,” in a similar way to how Araya and his colleagues do (Han, 2013: 
282). In fact, their primary goal was to see whether the international religious NGO, 
                                                
3 See Adams (2013) for, among other things, a discussion on publishing in medical and public 
health journals, especially Journal for the American Medical Association (JAMA), where Bolton 
et al (2003) is published. 
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WorldVision, with whom Bolton and his colleagues with university appointments collaborated, 
could incorporate the study into their work. 
 This experimentality reflects the GMH emphasis on “access to care” over “symptoms and 
etiology” (Bemme & D’Souza, 2014). Araya, Bolton, and Patel tack biomedical definitions for 
granted, even if the Bolton study used local illnesses as part of selecting participants. The 
experiment would have likely continued, even if they did not find any local illnesses. For Bolton 
and his coauthors (2003: 3124), this goal of access comes through language of impact: “We 
might expect even greater impact with more local experience with this approach.” The goal now 
is to refine the experiment to make it work even better and to go beyond Africa. The assumptions 
operating here are symptoms will look the same around the world, even accounting for local 
idioms and definitions, because of an underlying assumption about psychiatric disorder as 
biological (Bemme & D’Souza, 2014; Rees, 2014). Without having to worry much about 
tweaking symptoms or diagnostic categories, GMH practitioners can place their energy on 
ensuring that the intervention runs smoothly, remains true to RCT standards, and to consider how 
a localized intervention with positive outcomes can move beyond a clinic or a randomized set of 
villages. 
 While there is continuity with biomedical psychiatry and transcultural psychiatry through 
the use of particular technologies like the checklist and diagnostic categories and definitions 
from biomedical classification systems like the DSM, the tenth volume of the WHO's 
International Code of Diseases (ICD-10), or the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), it is 
necessary to ask "whether GMH is deliberately creating discontinuity with psychiatry's 
institutional and conceptual infrastructure." (Bemme and D'Souza, 2014: 858). Institutionally, 
the Bolton study reflects a move away from the standard institutional modes as it operates 
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outside of formal clinical environments; the Araya and Patel studies, however, through operating 
in a more clinical setting, continue to reflect the spaces where psychiatry and mental health have 
been treated. Conceptually, it moves away from psychiatry because of the rejection of 
pharmaceuticals as well as the emphasis on access to care. 
 Here, we see a consistency in the non-use of pharmaceuticals through this truncated 
history of psychiatric practices operating across cultural lines. The teams led by Mollica and 
Bolton did not use pharmaceuticals. Patel and Araya, however, do use pharmaceuticals in their 
trials. Why this difference? Because, as anthropologist-physician Didier Fassin writes (2012:99), 
"rather than being submitted to supranational political dimensions and inscribed in an ethical 
order with borders, [the globalization of health] continues to be principally ruled by national 
interests and state sovereignties serving local constituencies.” While I agree that there is a 
discontinuity between GMH and psychiatry – that GMH reveals, as I highlight below, that we 
need to question the discourses around the globalization of pharmaceuticals –the reasons for 
deploying pharmaceuticals in particular locations is more about the place itself than what is 
operating at the global space. Vikram Patel can claim to be against Big Pharma and continue to 
use pharmaceuticals in his research trials because it is, in part, about responding to the particular 
conditions.   
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CHAPTER 5: Theories of Pharmaceuticalization 
  
In this section, I want to put Patel's interconnected rejection of both pharmaceuticals and 
psychiatry in conversation with the anthropological literature. To review, Patel rejects psychiatry 
because he ultimately sees pharmaceutical companies corrupting its work. This means several 
things. First, it shapes the kind of therapeutic interventions that GMH actors will implement. 
Second, it indicates the kind of expertise and knowledge that is valued within GMH circles. 
Here, I argue that Patel's claims and the types of interventions and knowledge that GMH actors 
value do not follow the expected actions of recent theorizing in medical anthropology. 
 First, because of favoring psychosocial talk therapy interventions over pharmaceutical 
trials, Patel and GMH actors do not have a "pharmaceutical-centered [vision] of public health" 
(Biehl, 2007: 1084). As such, GMH actors force us to rethink the pharmaceuticalization 
occurring around the world. Anthropologist João Biehl, in drawing attention to processes of 
"pharmaceuticalization" in HIV programs in Brazil, argues that network connections between 
health, legal, political, and corporate actors shape a world in which pharmaceuticals become the 
necessary and best means through which to treat individuals at the expense of a highly unequal 
healthcare system. Biehl’s critique is that cheap pharmaceuticals become a way to manage 
populations, particularly the marginalized, and that by having a “pharmaceutical-centered public 
health” approach worldwide, the government is able to biopolitically engage in forms of 
dependency and subject making.  
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 While Biehl is correct that, for certain populations, individuals are becoming increasingly 
governed and defined by their medications, the GMH discourses and practices raise questions 
about how much of a global phenomenon is pharmaceuticalization. What do we do if we are all 
“pharmaceutical selves” (Jenkins, 2010), whether we know it or not, yet particular global health 
and medical actors refuse pharmaceuticals on political economic grounds? What how do we deal 
with changing technologies and risk factors and blurry, ever-changing standards (Dumit, 2012) 
when some tools have lines for diagnosis and treatment are increasingly blurry? What do we do 
when some actors are, instead of providing pharmaceuticals, they are using long-standing 
diagnostic technologies, e.g. checklists, that have used roughly the same cut-off for years to 
indicate an individual’s experiences as more depressed-like symptoms?  
 Second, the privileging of talk therapy and the rejection of the domination of 
pharmaceuticals within psychiatry reflects how GMH scholars are of a different mind concerning 
psychiatric practices. Anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann (2000) has convincingly explored how 
psychiatry as a discipline remains “of two minds,” in tension between two therapeutic traditions. 
One is more biomedical, where healing comes through pharmacological treatments; the other 
follows the psychoanalytic traditions, where talk therapy and psychoanalysis allow patients to 
uncover and address the root of their illness.4 In her book, Luhrmann argues that psychiatry 
experienced a shift where the biomedical forms of psychiatry became hegemonic to the longer 
psychoanalytic tradition. As such, pharmaceuticals come to dominate the discipline not only as 
                                                
4 Lakoff (2005) also examines similar tensions. There are several differences between the 
American and Argentinian psychiatrists and the GMH researchers. For both Lakoff and 
Luhrmann, they are exploring what happens when new ideas and technologies enter a pre-
existing system. In this essay, however, the GMH scientists are trying to establish completely 
new infrastructures for mental health care around the world. In a way, GMH researchers avoid 
these concerns with the focus on infrastructure.  
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the primary source of treatment, but also the focus of scientific research shifts to focus on the 
brain than considering the social conditions of the individual.  
 The GMH discourse, taken with Patel’s keynote as the paradigm, is disinterested the 
biological discourses on mental illness. While Patel argues that GMH is global health, not 
psychiatry, he and his co-laborers cannot escape the traditions and ideas from psychiatry given 
the focus of their humanitarian action: the mentally ill. GMH is not interested in conducting 
research on biological etiology, but is interested in health systems building (Bemme & D’Souza, 
2014). There is certainly a concern for the biological within global mental health and global 
health writ large (Bemme & D’Souza, 2014; Rees, 2014), but the biological emerges in the 
construction of humanity. Brains and bodies operate the same across all humans, which 
facilitates, in part, for the geographic movement and translation of global health interventions. 
Ignoring etiological questions that pharmaceutical companies would find more interesting (and 
profitable), GMH can then devote its resources for designing low-cost interventions, researching 
how to improve health systems that do not provide much for the mentally ill, and trying to reduce 
the social inequalities around mental health.  
 In fact, "one might say that GMH has decidedly black-boxed academic psychiatry's 
central questions such as exact disease causation and classification, focusing instead on the 
language of providing 'access to care'" (Bemme and D'Souza, 2014: 858). By relying on 
biomedical categories, GMH scholars then look to the social determinants of poor health rather 
than the biological. For example, the use of symptom checklists indicates a reliance on 
biomedical categories, even with the often-given caveat of "we want something better, but this is 
the best we have right now" and the inclusion of local explanatory models and disorders. But, 
more central to GMH's mission, is the reduction of the "treatment gap" that focuses on the social, 
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not biological, causes of diseases. This black-boxing also returns us to the experimentation 
required to uncover the right ways to reduce the treatment gap.  
 While I do not disagree with Biehl, Lurhmann, and others that particular subjectivities 
emerge through pharmaceutical use, it is clear to me that GMH as a movement, and particular in 
the GMH interventions implemented in east Africa described below, and its rejection of both 
pharmaceuticals and parts of biomedical psychiatry asks us to reconsider how dominating these 
discourses are. The conversations in which Biehl, Luhrmann, and their interlocutors engaged 
have been productive, as they have interrogated the politics of pharmaceuticals: who has access? 
Who doesn't? And why? What creates the conditions for pharmaceutical use in some places, and 
not others? What facilitates the use of pharmaceuticals as a therapeutic regimen? There is no 
doubt that pharmaceutical use has increased with the influence of pharmaceutical companies in 
the global economy (Dumit, 2012), the move for equal access of "essential medicines" (Greene, 
2011), and the political force of AIDS activism, among others. Yet despite these claims, we need 
to be careful of what Byron Good (2010) calls "pharmaceutical hegemony.” In a sense, Good 
sees two “pharmaceutical hegemonies.” First, pharmaceutical companies have a hegemonic 
influence on the globalization of psychiatric practices. Second, he sees two competing, yet 
hegemonic discourses in their respective academic fields, noting an irony that anthropologists 
see too many pharmaceuticals and the WHO in mhGAP see too few.  
 Given these tensions, he situates Indonesia against both of these. First, in not having 
access to pharmaceuticals, Good (2010: 131) argues that psychiatrists in Indonesia are “certainly 
drawn into and engaged in the hegemonizing processes of global pharma. But…they are also 
drawn into the struggle to care for difficult, psychotic patients for whom there are no magic 
bullets.” It is not to say that pharmaceutical companies have no influence in Indonesia – Good 
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acknowledges they do – yet environments where pharmaceuticals are not readily available, nor 
are they seen as an adequate therapy by patients, temper and resist the hegemonic processes of 
Big Pharma. In other words, it is not possible in some places to have a “pharmaceutical-centered 
public health.” 
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CHAPTER 6: GMH Out of Africa? 
 
 As noted, Bolton and his colleagues justify the use of psychosocial interventions instead 
of pharmaceuticals because of cost and infrastructure. Such rationale places the intervention 
within the realm of the political economy. In Uganda, and elsewhere in the world, economic 
constraints facilitate what kinds of studies GMH researchers can conduct. This, however, is not 
always the case. In considering the Patel and Araya studies, researchers conducted their studies 
in clinical settings using pharmaceuticals. India is well known for its open market for 
psychopharmaceuticals in both clinical and non-clinical settings (Halliburton, 2009); it has an 
infrastructure for generic psychiatric medications that patients can get on the street without a 
prescription. 
 As this is not the case, I want to ask: is there something about work in Africa that sheds 
light on why psychopharmaceutical interventions do not happen. Pharmaceuticals in Sub-
Saharan African global health research are ubiquitous as a result of HIV policies and research. 
There has been considerable work to create spaces for HIV medications, compliance with AIDS 
medications, among others. For example, Bolton and his colleagues conduct the study not in 
Kampala, Uganda’s capital, but in two rural southwestern districts, Masaka and Rakai. In 1987, 
Johns Hopkins and Ugandan researchers began an HIV/AIDS study in the Rakai district. Later, 
in 2007, the Rakai Heath Sciences Program formally opened new spaces (Rakai Heath Sciences 
Program, 2010). The Rakai Health Center now dispenses anti-retrial viral medication (ARVs) to 
reduce the HIV viral load following the 2004 rollout of the United States’ President’s Emergency 
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Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR; Kunihira et al, 2010). Whether there is a direct connection 
between the Bolton study and the HIV work in Rakai is not known. 
 If we consider Brian Larkin’s (2013: 329) ontology of infrastructure as the relationship 
between “built things, knowledge things, [and] people things,” during implementation of the 
intervention, “built things” that could potentially facilitate a cost-effective use of 
psychopharmaceuticals did not exist. Offering the explanation of “high cost and limited supply 
infrastructure” as one reason for not using pharmaceuticals, Bolton and his colleagues (2003: 
3117-8) suggest that they did not have the ability to acquire, transport, and dispense 
pharmaceuticals in the Rakai setting. While it seems that WorldVision had been working in 
Uganda for some time, what it could offer was “people things,” in the form of a work force and 
connections to the local community at the onset of the study. Yet there are no specialized 
“people things” to facilitate the intervention. Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers are 
not mentioned as part of what would make pharmaceuticals a viable intervention, people who 
could also provide “knowledge things” about the local context. It is also possible that the latter 
two “things” encouraged not using pharmaceuticals.  
 In considering the political economy of global health research, Julie Livingston’s (2012) 
ethnographic work on cancer in Botswana offers some parallels for considering the place of 
mental health and psychopharmaceuticals in Uganda. Livingston argues that cancer only become 
visible through HIV. Because HIV is considered a sexually transmitted disease (STD), cancer 
becomes a possibility through the recognition of Human Papilloma Virus, another STD that 
causes forms of cervical cancer. As cancer becomes recognized, oncological care providers run 
into the significant challenge that knowledge about cancer comes from North America and often 
does not mean much to oncological care in Botswana. Research studies on treatment discuss new 
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chemotherapy treatments, pain medications, and protocols that do not translate for Botswana 
because of the lack of resources. This lack of translation contributed to the conditions for 
improvised care: because cancer is ontologically different in Africa because of the technologies 
available and how it is conceptually understood, the knowledge produced in North America and 
the Global North does not apply equally. 
 Livingston provokes a number of similarities between cancer and mental health 
interventions in Africa. First, HIV renders the possibility of mental health research possible as 
well. In 2000, in contrast to the political economy and activist state in Brazil during the 1990s 
(Biehl, 2004) at the time of their research in Uganda, the Ugandan government had just begun 
ART programming on a small scale. Psychiatry had a strong presence internationally in Uganda 
until 1972 when Idi Amin overthrew the Ugandan government (Pringle, 2013). As such, there is 
no large professional presence and network for debates over the kinds of research or 
pharmaceuticals to emerge. Instead, it is only through other concerns and priorities, i.e. the 
prevalence of HIV and the existing infrastructure, that mental health comes to the surface 
because of Bolton and his colleagues conduct their study in a place where HIV research is going 
on: “[i]n 2000, we conducted a community-based survey [on depression] in an impoverished part 
of southwest Uganda affected by [HIV]” (Bolton et al, 2003: 3117). Genealogically, according to 
historian Meghan Vaughan (2016: 505), because HIV researchers began using counseling as a 
means through which to help HIV/AIDS patients, even before PEPFAR at Bolton and his 
colleagues’ research indicates, mental health concerns become visible through AIDS 
interventions. In this way, the political economy of HIV research (which, at that time, did not 
include pharmaceuticals in Uganda) facilitates the possibility of research on other disorders. 
Such research can create new forms of connection via partnerships, as is the case with the Bolton 
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Study, (Crane, 2013) as well as the ways in which individuals come to live as research subjects 
among the broader population. 
 Second, in addition to being made possible through HIV, cancer and mental health are 
similar in the need to translate treatments. As the Bolton study indicates, the kinds of treatments 
and interventions possible are more mobile for mental health than for cancer. This is because talk 
therapies can easily travel (Nyugen, 2010). As a technology, these therapies require linguistic 
and cultural translation and training of community health workers, in contrast to oncological 
chemotherapies that require more material infrastructure to possibly be effective.5 For Bolton, his 
study did not need the infrastructure of a clinical setting and existing professionalization, along 
with the additional storage technologies for chemotherapy drugs. This intervention is more easily 
implemented in low-resource settings. 
 Yet the Bolton study does not use drug treatments in the same way that cancer or HIV 
requires. Drawing on Biehl (2007), Livingston (2012: 41) writes, “pharmaceuticals, while really 
important, are offered in the absence of and as a replacement for hollowed out African health 
systems.” As global health actors provide medications, especially HIV medications, these 
regimens become a way through which to offer medical care without having the infrastructure to 
attend to other needs. With both HIV and malaria, medications can help tremendously but cannot 
address other possible biological complications alone. Treating additional challenges, however, 
requires professionals in some capacity, whether doctors, nurses, or community health workers. 
To professionalize and have the health system infrastructure to provide employment often 
requires a more significant investment from international governments, national governments, 
                                                
5 This is qualified because Livingston herself is concerned with the way in which oncological 
research conducted in the US is not relevant and cannot take into consideration the challenges in 
Botswana to understand and treat cancer patients. 
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and philanthropic organizations. With psychosocial interventions, the same kinds of systems of 
professionalization are not necessary; only community health workers trained in short courses 
are necessary for implementation, especially if the aim is symptom reduction. 
 Treating mental health can fall outside of the hollowed-out health system without 
pharmaceuticals in a way that other illnesses cannot. Other illnesses, such as HIV and malaria, 
require pharmacological regimens in order properly treat someone who with the disease. Yet 
psychosocial interventions are being offered instead of pharmaceuticals because of not having 
the proper facilities and protocols. For GMH, their documents clearly state 
psychopharmaceuticals should not be dispensed without the requisite infrastructure. The Bolton 
study as well seemed to follow suit on this. As noted above, despite wanting to implement a 
pharmaceutical intervention, the researchers opted for a psychosocial program instead that 
required less funding, less infrastructure, and less actual resources, which follows the global 
health ethos of cost-effectiveness (Adams, 2016). 
 Not providing pharmaceuticals on the grounds of cost and infrastructure becomes clear 
this is not only a practical consideration, but also an ethical one. One possible and frequent 
ethical justification for not providing pharmaceuticals is because a particular culture does not 
accept drugs as a sufficient form of treatment.6 This, however, is not what is going on with the 
Bolton study. The dispensing of drugs cannot happen under the appropriate condition, so in order 
to act (which is an assumed ethic), we must provide a treatment that can be equitably provided 
and proved effective in order to consider scaling up services. While not present in the 
documents, a potential logic is that in conducting psychosocial interventions, an evidence base 
                                                
6 What this does not account for is the possibility of ethnographic evidence suggesting that, for 
mental illness, global health has created expectations for the use of medications and to not 
dispense them becomes an ethical violation as a result of global health care being constituted by 
pharmaceuticals. 
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emerges that shows psychiatric care is both needed and possible. This data can serve as the 
political and economic justification for implementing wider services.  
 This is not to say that pharmaceutical and psychosocial interventions do not show up 
together – they certainly do. As the Patel and Araya studies from GMH indicate, alongside of 
Sharon Abramowitz’s (2014) ethnographic work in Liberia, pharmaceuticals work in some 
settings and are desired despite the presence of psychosocial interventions. While Peter Locke 
(2015) has described the blurred lines between humanitarianism and global health, I want to 
differentiate here between the NGO humanitarian practices around medications in Abramowitz’s 
text from the GMH research-interventions. The NGO, broadly, remains established as part of a 
health infrastructure, as minimal as it is in many places. These organizations, however, look to 
fill in a gap in the health infrastructure to provide care.  
Because of this, although this line can be blurry at time as well, NGOs are different than 
other humanitarian organizations and global health actors. Humanitarian actors like Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) that respond in crises or global health actors who come to experiment 
hold a different temporality and ethic because they are not inherently committed to the long-
term. Those responding to crisis do not want to create formal infrastructure; they create kits and 
mobile forms of medical care that implemented in any kind of crisis environment (Redfield, 
2013: 88-89). They can bring pharmaceuticals into environments for temporary relief if 
necessary. Mental health responders can come in to triage trauma and other disorders (Breslau, 
2000). The infrastructure, initially, is always temporary, committed only to the present. Even if 
an organization remains in crisis environment longterm, there is always the possibility and 
constant reminder that an organization will leave (McKay, 2017).  
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This is different still than the temporality and ethics of experiment, where I place GMH 
actors and interventions. The temporality of GMH research-intervention is set for a strict period 
pf time, typically dictated by recourses and grant-funding. When researchers implement these 
psychosocial interventions, thy go in with a small-scale project with the hopes of garnering 
political capital and scientific results to scale services up. If both are successful, with GMH the 
goal is to find ways to bolster and create new forms of infrastructure, mobilized by the data at 
hand. But, if the funding runs out or the intervention fails, there is no commitment to any kind of 
permanent or temporarily infrastructure that exists. This research runs the risk of leaving new 
infrastructure empty, newly trained health workers without work, and the community left with 
reminders of experimentation (Prince, 2012). 
Where the GMH and humanitarian actors like MSF overlap in relationship to 
infrastructure is that there is a standardization to the infrastructure (Star, 1999; Star & Lampland, 
2009). While What this means in the context of psychopharmaceuticals and GMH interventions 
is precisely the Bolton study’s abstract claim that its findings can influence other parts of Africa 
and beyond. But for Bolton and his coauthors, it is not about psychiatric medications moving to 
other parts of the world, but talk therapy alone. Their results indicate a success in reducing 
depression-like symptoms. With one successful study, Bolton and his fellow GMH researchers 
can move around the world to implement talk therapy interventions. Yet it not just Bolton’s 
collaborators whose experiments to reduce mental health disorders by adapting a talk therapy in 
a new part of the world; it is hard to find any GMH research with pharmaceuticals. In this way, 
Bolton’s study of no medications, in contrast to Araya and Patel’s early studies, set the tone for 
future research. In many cases, it is still too early in the Movement to see what happens after the 
research project is complete and if Big Pharma finds new ways to capitalize of GMH’s work. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
 
 In this essay, I have argued that the place of pharmaceuticals in Global Mental Health is 
one of contradiction: a firm rejection by both the movement’s architects and the intervention 
practices reflected in the scientific literature despite limited usage of medication in certain 
contexts. In this way, the process of pharmaceuticalization laid out by Biehl (2007) does not take 
hold in GMH projects. Vikram Patel in his speeches, along with other scholars who associate 
with GMH, do not have pharmaceutical-centered vision of public health when it comes to their 
own research on mental illness around the world. By rooting his critique of Big Pharma as a 
condemnation against the psychiatric establishment, Patel works to prevent any influence of 
pharmaceutical corporations into GMH. In wanting to move beyond pharmaceuticals, Patel and 
others seek to engage in a different kind of moral and political economy. 
Yet as the parentheses in my title indicate, despite the strong rejection, pharmaceuticals 
are sparingly present in GMH practices. While the presence of pharmaceutical companies 
appears minimal-to-none, they are nonetheless there, if for no other reason than Patel’s 
contextualization in his own research. The lack of pharmaceuticals exists because of GMH’s 
rejection of pharmaceutical companies influence in psychiatry as well as their embrace of the 
global health paradigm of cost-effectiveness-driven metrics.  
 Within the contradiction, however, GMH researchers engage in practices that have their 
roots in pharmaceutical. From the before the codified emergence of the Movement in 2007, 
GMH researchers have been committed to using the Randomized Control Trial. Yet their use of 
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the randomized control trial to treat depression seems to be working against the original, 
intended goals of the RCT (Dumit, 2012). While their use reflects the RCT’s use more broadly 
within global health (Adams, 2013), other health concerns do not have the same explicit 
relationship to pharmaceutical companies as mental health. In this way, one might hypothesize 
that GMH is using Big Pharma’s own tools to show that mental health care for depression can 
occur without the use of medications. 
Yet Patel’s explicit rejection of “big pharma” and GMH’s research agenda both in its 
policy and research publications raises particular ethical concerns. GMH’s reject of 
psychopharmaceuticals seems to erase – or is perhaps its solution – to global unequal access to 
psychiatric medications. The rhetoric of cost-effectiveness still pervades, showing another space 
where GMH actors are deploying pharmaceutical logics against what they imagine as corporate 
interests. The ethics of experiment present ethical questions about commitment to research 
subjects, to infrastructure, and to long-term systemic mental health care for both depression and 
other mental disorders.  
But their rejection of medications is also raises the question of who decides what is good 
for certain populations. Medications are used in other interventions for long-term and short-term 
illness. Some illnesses biologically demand “drugs for life” whereas others are constructed in 
ways to make pharmaceutical companies profits (Dumit, 2012). In many places around the 
world, GMH research operates within a “projectified landspace” (Whyte et al, 2013) where 
pharmaceuticals help define the terms of that landscape. Research participants may expect 
pharmaceuticals, only to find out they will not receive any. GMH actors might have to then 
navigate the murky ethical waters of their own commitments and the lived realities and existing 
infrastructure.  
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 Lastly, what exactly does it mean to reject “Big Pharma”? Is it just to not use 
pharmaceuticals? It is to use the methods it helped to create to generate larger markets for other 
purposes? Or does rejecting “Big Pharma” require a larger critique that engages with structural 
concerns about the ways in which market logics seep into discourse? To more fully reject Big 
Pharma, would GMH have to articulate an ethic for action that is not rooted in other tools, i.e 
cost-effectiveness? Would it be to overcome the two pharmaceutical hegemonies of intervention 
practice and perceptions of researchers? Would it be to find new ways of creating knowledge not 
rooted in the randomized control trial? 
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